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Abstract  
In a continuously evolving world system, it is more crucial than ever for the European 
Union (EU) to work as a cohesive and unified bloc. Yet this is hindered by the EU’s inability to 
fully integrate member states and its futile enlargement objectives. The EU’s ambitions in the 
Western Balkans include a full implementation of European values within the region by making 
membership an incentive. This tactic is two-fold; it increases the EU’s influence in the Western 
Balkans by negating Russia’s power,  and it unifies a larger portion of the continent. However, the 
current enlargement policy is not sufficient enough to withstand Kosovo’s disputed independence. 
This debate creates a dichotomy between member states that support Kosovo’s independence and 
those that do not. Thus, this paper aims to answer the question of how much is Serbia willing to 
compromise in order to become an EU member state, and how much is the EU willing to 
compromise to strengthen its influence in the Western Balkans. To do so,  a case study comparing 
Serbia and Croatia’s accession processes will be presented. This paper will analyze the effect 
Kosovo’s status will have on the accession process in terms of member state consensus. Finally, 
this paper will advance recommendations for ways in which the EU can adjust the accession for 
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 Kosovo is a small nation whose statehood is disputed globally. As it stands, Kosovo faces 
a dichotomy in relation to its autonomy; it is considered both an independent enclave of Serbia 
and a sovereign and independent state. Serbia vehemently denies Kosovo’s independence, which 
is also disputed amongst the European Union (EU) member states. Despite the lack of an explicit 
clause, Kosovo’s recognition is an implied condition of Serbia’s membership. Serbia’s chances 
of EU accession remain unlikely as long as the Kosovo question remains unsettled. Thus, this 
paper aims to answer the question of how much is Serbia willing to compromise in order to 
become an EU member state, and how much is the EU willing to compromise to strengthen its 
influence in the Western Balkans. Additionally, the study will explore the constraints that 
member state consensus places on enlargement in the Western Balkans, and how this affects the 
regions’ relations with Russia. The objective of this paper overall is to use Serbia-Kosovo 
relations as a focal point that will examine policy consensus amongst EU member states in terms 
of EU enlargement policy. Furthermore, a case study comparing Serbia’s candidacy status and 
Croatia’s accession process will be subsequently presented in order to highlight the EU’s 
willingness to adapt for Western Balkan enlargement. The objective is to reveal the tactics that 
need to be adjusted in order for the EU to proceed with Serbia’s accession and the special case of 
Kosovo. This study argues that a special clause needs to be included in Serbia’s accession 
negotiations regarding Kosovo, and conclusory observations will present what the 
aforementioned clause should entail.  
 
Literature Review  
 
Enlargement Policy in the Western Balkans 
  In 2018 the EU unveiled a new enlargement strategy meant to facilitate Western Balkan 
alignment with EU values and standards. Bonomi (2019) argues that European integration from 
this point onward will need to adapt, and new combinations of bargaining will arise. In order for 
enlargement to be successful in the Western Balkans, the EU needs to adjust its integration 
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process and negotiations considering each state in the Western Balkans has a history of conflict 
with other actors in the region. This paper underscores this assertion by arguing that Serbia’s 
accession process needs to be approached differently than enlargement in the past due to the 
dispute over Kosovo’s independence. It is a new beast per se, in the sense that no state has 
entered the EU while also having a recently seceded territory with its own accession aspirations. 
Economides and Ker-Lindsay (2015) present an argument along these lines, stating that Serbia’s 
accession process treats Europeanization as a policy rather than the ultimate goal. This study will 
expand on this argument by providing evidence of Serbia’s unique accession process and 
comparing it to that of Croatia’s. Kosovo shows it is willing to dedicate itself to the European 
identity. However, Serbia’s public attitude towards the EU is waning, which forces the EU to 
adapt if it wants to be successful in enlargement as well as support Kosovo’s independence. The 
EU’s ability to adapt its foreign policy and enlargement strategies can be described as principled 
pragmatism. According to Juncos (2017), this consists of a balancing act from the EU side 
between European values and compromises that arise from Western Balkan integration. The 
concept of principled pragmatism is relevant to Serbia – and eventually Kosovo’s – accession. 
The EU needs to take into account the reality of relations between Serbia and Kosovo, seeing as 
it is not a typical issue that can be fixed with traditional diplomacy. Ensuring the Western 
Balkans adheres to EU values for the long-term will require the right configuration of power and 
interests, as Juncos states. This paper will use the three aforementioned arguments to highlight 
the fact that the case of Serbia’s accession is unlike anything the EU has dealt with before, and 
thus new methods and strategies are necessary to move forward. Through a comparison with 
Croatia’s accession, this study will highlight the areas in which reconfiguration is needed.  
 
European Union Theories of Bargaining Power 
Only 23 member states formally recognize Kosovo as an independent state and despite 
this majority, the five that do not acknowledge its independence hold more bargaining power 
over the majority. This puzzle will be addressed in the following sections in order to explore the 
individual power that certain member states have over this matter and ultimately the enlargement 
process as a whole. Such bargaining power, according to Konig and Slapin (2006), makes itself 
increasingly present when there is a dispute at hand. This study utilizes this argument and 
ascertains that the minority of member states have more power over the Kosovo dispute than the 
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EU would like to admit, which drastically changes the way enlargement and Serbia’s accession 
need to be approached. Furthermore, certain member states that align with Serbia have distinct 
qualities that give them more bargaining power; their proximity to Russia and relatively new 
status as a member state. This study argues that power in this regard is indicative of member 
states’ chances of being a pivotal player in negotiations. This claim is based on Bailer (2010), 
who claims that current distributions of power favor big and nearly-big member states, such as 
Spain, but also give smaller EU member states more voting power and influence than economic 
size would indicate.  
 
Competition for Western Balkan Influence: Russia versus the European Union 
 Enlargement in the Western Balkans is a geopolitical strategy that strengthens the EU 
bloc and creates a regional blockade to Russian power. Russia’s overarching goal in the Western 
Balkans is to repudiate Europeanization and integration and assert influence in order to create 
regional competition. This assertive policy has not reversed the region’s European integration 
(Secrieru 2019), but it has created insecurity about the benefits of EU membership. This paper 
expands Secrieru’s argument that the EU needs to pursue more vigorous pushback policies 
against Russia in the region. Furthermore, this study suggests the way to do this is through 
stronger efforts to sustain and encourage integration and enlargement. Thus, Serbia becomes a 
strategic tool to thwart Russian influence and must be integrated sooner rather than later, making 
the Kosovo dispute a time-sensitive issue. Van Ham (2014) states that the EU’s leverage over the 
Western Balkans is dwindling and becoming more obsolete. This study uses this author’s claims 
as a reason to reform the current enlargement policy. This is due to the fact that as the EU’s 
attractiveness wanes, opportunities arise for outside actors to engage with the region. If the EU 
continues to struggle with its enlargement consensus, the Western Balkans, and more specifically 
Serbia, may become restless. Belgrade is happy to be “Russia’s privileged partner,” as Secrieru 
states, and as long as they receive support from both Russia and the EU there is no incentive to 
change their foreign policy. As stated above, the rise of Eurosceptic parties and leaders makes 






Kosovo’s Fight for Legitimacy: An Overview 
 
Conflict Build-up  
  Kosovo is stuck in what can be considered unfinished statehood; meaning it has qualities 
of both a sovereign state and a stateless nation. Within the region, the ethnic make-up is an 
Albanian majority and a Serbian minority. Kosovo became part of Serbia early in the 20th 
century and was officially recognized as a province of Serbia following the second world war. 
The Serbian minority and Serbian government viewed this incorporation as the rightful return of 
territory. In contrast, the Albanian majority was outraged and viewed this move as an annexation 
that effectively marginalized the majority (Congressional Research Service 2020). When 
Yugoslavia dissolved in 1991 Kosovo lost its status as a federal entity, and its autonomy was 
abolished by Serbia. Throughout the 1990s, Serbian authorities excessively discriminated against 
Kosovo’s Albanians (Kosovars). The marginalized group was excluded from administrative, 
health and education systems (Rohan 2018). Riots held by Kosovars ensued as thousands were 
put out of work and restrictions were placed on their gatherings and cultural organizations. Mass 
amounts of oppression and marginalization led by Slobodan Milosevic – former president of 
Serbia charged with multiple counts of war crimes – leads to the secret vote and creation of the 
Republic of Kosovo in 1991, which earned little international recognition (PBS 2017). Over the 
next five years, little changed, and Kosovo’s struggles were overshadowed by the war in Bosnia. 
Kosovar President Ibrahim Rugova – elected during the secret vote – pursued a pacifist strategy 
of peaceful resistance during that time, but there was a distinct lack of progress. Starting in 1996 
the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) commences sporadic attacks against Serbian officials in 
Kosovo, leading to intensified repression, massive military operations, and atrocious acts from 
the Serbian government.  
 
Outside Intervention  
 After failed negotiation discussions between the involved parties, NATO decided to 
intervene on Kosovo’s behalf in March 1999 (Rohan 2018). However, this resulted in Serbian 
retaliation and subsequently led to 800,000 displaced Kosovars. NATO airstrikes thus continued 
for approximately three months until President Milosevic finally agreed to withdraw all security 
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forces from Kosovo. On June 10, 1999, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1244 which 
established a UN-led interim administration. Furthermore, this resolution asserted that Kosovo 
still belonged “de jure” to Serbia but was a UN protectorate. In 2006 the political process began 
to establish an independent democracy and decide Kosovo’s future role on the world stage. 
Seventeen rounds of negotiations were held in Vienna between Serbian and Kosovar delegations 
as well as a Contact Group that consisted of Germany, France, Italy, Russia, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. Along with the UN, the Contact Group stipulated principles of a 
peace settlement which stated Kosovo’s future status must ensure multiethnicity cooperation and 
insurance that government participation would be allowed for all communities. The Republic of 
Kosovo formally declared its independence from Serbia in 2008. Kosovo’s recognition around 
the world has increased since 1999. As it stands, 111 member states of the UN formally 
recognize Kosovo as a sovereign state. 
 
Serbia’s Prospective Accession into the European Union 
 
Normalization  
 Relations between Serbia and Kosovo following the 2008 declaration of independence 
were hostile. Although tensions did not amount to violence, all ambassadors from countries that 
formally recognized Kosovo’s sovereignty were expelled from Serbia. Since 2008, countless 
steps were taken to normalize relations between the two, which have been led by the European 
Union (EU). By mitigating the normalization process, the EU ultimately hopes that Serbia will 
formally recognize Kosovo as an independent state. Decreasing tensions in the Western Balkans 
will allow both Serbia and Kosovo to move forward and make substantial progress towards EU 
accession, increasing their influence in the region. In 2013 a 15-point bilateral agreement 
between the two entities was signed. The “First Agreement of Principles Governing the 
Normalization of Relations” is a historic achievement between Serbia and Kosovo. However, 
Serbia’s motives can hardly be categorized under Europeanization. While the EU dangles many 
carrots for Serbian accession, the country pursues foreign relationships – in particular with 
Russia –  that allow them to reap the benefits. Serbia’s foreign policy is that of non-alignment, 
meaning it pursues relations with multiple different actors each with their own advantages (DG 
for External Policies 2017). Based on its foreign policy objectives, this study argues that Serbia 
6 
will pursue any avenue that provides political and economic opportunism. With that being said, 
Serbia will only commit to full normalization –  meaning acknowledging Kosovo’s 
independence –  if there are material benefits from the declaration, which diminishes the power 
of membership’s incentive. Another obstacle to normalization is the fact that Serbia views the 
process as a threat to its sovereignty since the process implies Kosovo’s eventual recognition 
(Wochnik 2012). The normalization process has the potential to drive Serbia even farther from 
Europeanization and even decrease their desire to become an EU member state, hindering the 
EU’s plans for Western Balkan integration.  
 
How Kosovo Plays a Role  
Serbia’s refusal to accept Kosovo as an independent nation is detrimental to its EU 
accession. As its candidacy aspirations continue, Serbia fails to completely Europeanize its 
foreign policy in regard to Kosovo (Wochnik 2012). In other words, the incentive of EU 
membership fails to encourage Serbia to normalize its relations with Kosovo in a way that is 
completely in line with EU standards. However, there is currently no official conditionality 
clause that exists in which Serbia must recognize Kosovo if it wants to join the EU. Despite the 
lack of a formal clause, or perhaps due to the lack of a clause, relations are at a standstill. As it 
stands Serbia is not required to recognize Kosovo’s independence as a condition of EU 
membership. A requirement for Western Balkans states to join the EU is “good neighborly 
relations and regional cooperation” (Wochnik 2012). There is an underlying implication that the 
Serbia-Kosovo deadlock must be resolved in order for accession to be complete. In the long-
term, the EU envisions a completely integrated Western Balkans that includes Kosovo. This 
vision will not be possible if member states block Serbia’s EU accession.  
Further complications arise when one takes into account the lack of consensus amongst 
current member states about Kosovo’s independence. The EU’s influence and role in the area is 
undermined by its inability to normalize relations between Serbia and Kosovo, a problem that 
has decreased the institution’s own credibility (Chun 2011). The lack of unity and policy 
consensus in regard to Kosovo’s independence hinders the accession of both Serbia and Kosovo 
and risks deeper cleavages within the EU over enlargement policies. Due to a lack of consensus 
on Kosovo’s statehood, the EU has no official policy on its recognition. Batt (2005) asserts that 
the EU’s commitment to Western Balkan integration is contingent on the transformation of the 
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region into that of a peaceful and prosperous area. The idea is that Serbia will redefine its 
national and foreign policy interests based on incentives that the EU offers. However, it is 
difficult to present the ultimatum of “Kosovo or Europe” when not all EU member states 
recognize Kosovo as an independent state. For an organization based on unity, this lack of policy 
consensus creates a stalemate amongst decision-makers. Five member states do not recognize 
Kosovo as an independent nation; Spain, Slovakia, Cyprus, Romania, and Greece. These 
member states fear that Kosovo’s secession will ignite movements within their own borders 
(Vicere 2019). In order to uphold the stance of the other 22 member states that do in fact 
recognize Kosovo, the EU has adopted a status-neutral position, allowing it to mediate relations 
between Kosovo and Serbia without bias. However, this lack of policy consensus within the EU 
limits its enlargement capabilities and diminishes its goals of territorial peace and democracy 
within the Western Balkans.  
 
Geopolitical Constraints and European Union Conditionality  
 The Western Balkans have a tradition of instability and conflict in the post-Yugoslavia 
world. EU conditionality and international pressure have been the most effective tools in eliciting 
cooperation and stability in the region. The EU uses soft-power by incentivizing membership to 
ensure Western Balkan states comply with the Hague-based International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (Hartmann 2009). In the case of Croatia, strict EU conditionality 
and ICTY cooperation strengthened pro-EU forces in the country and led the emergence of a 
consensus on EU accession. Serbia, on the other hand, is resistant to Europeanization. Yet the 
EU makes compromises in terms of conditionality, which now is applied selectively due to the 
differences between each Western Balkan candidate. In other words, the EU is more lenient 
towards Serbia because it is a “special case,” already adjusting the process from that of Croatia. 
Since the breakup of Yugoslavia, Serbia has been resistant to the spirit of ultimate reform. The 
EU has proven it is willing to selectively apply the conditionality clause in order to maintain the 
carrot of membership. This strategy will not be effective in truly accomplishing democratization 
and Europeanization in the long-run, which are two values that the EU cannot compromise for 






 Serbia continues to remain a candidacy country, which opens the door for its traditional 
Slavic ally Russia. Despite the EU’s attractiveness in regard to trade, investment, aid and 
stability, Russia has offered political support for Serbia in its stance against Kosovo’s 
recognition. Russia does not recognize Kosovo as a sovereign state, a move which Serbia has 
reciprocated by refusing to impose sanctions against Russian as a reaction to Crimea (DG for 
External Policies 2017). Its policy of amity and cooperation with Serbia underscore Russia’s 
desire to be influential in the Western Balkans, undermining EU enlargement and integration 
policies. Russia and Serbia’s historical Slovac relationship, exacerbated by the Kosovo dispute, 
can be detrimental in the long-term and has the potential to cripple Serbia’s chances of EU 
accession (Radeljic 2016). In the same token, it can also push Serbia towards closer EU relations 
if Serbia chooses to align its values and foreign policy with those of the West. EU accession 
negotiations and enlargement objectives have not derailed Russia from its relations with Serbia, 
and its influence in the candidate state remains strong after its recent backsliding.   
 
Examining Member States’ Positions: Classifications 
 
Member State Positions 






Greece, Romania, Slovakia  
Recognizers  Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, and Sweden 
 
 
Non-recognizers and Non-engagers  
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Spain’s Position. Spain is the most influential EU member state that refuses to recognize 
Kosovo as a sovereign independent state. It’s decision to not recognize Kosovo’s independence 
is political and cultural in nature. By supporting its sovereignty, Spain would be accused of 
promoting secessionist movements and the aspirations of independentist politicians (McShane 
2011). Spain has outwardly declared that it considers the right of self-determination and 
secessionist movements as illegal and has accused Kosovo of violating international law, and has 
been extremely sympathetic towards Serbia. Spain’s refusal to recognize Kosovo stems from its 
own vehement denial of Catalonia’s secession as legal and legitimate. Despite the fact that all the 
major EU countries have recognized Kosovo, Spain has managed to diminish the possibility of 
an EU consensus on its foreign policy position by equating Catalonia and Kosovo. Given the 
recent 2017 declaration that Catalonia’s independence referendum was unlawful, Spain’s 
position against Kosovo has only hardened. Forecasts do not predict that Spain will change its 
position on the matter in the near future which does not bode well for Kosovo’s accession 
prospects and the EU’s vision of enlargement in the Western Balkans. Spain has even gone as far 
as to say that despite the EU’s well-wishes for the region, enlargement is not to be used as a 
conflict-prevention instrument (Rettman 2018).  
Spain clearly does not support the enlargement strategy that the EU is currently pursuing, 
making a distinction between the enlargement process and political ambitions in the Western 
Balkans. Out of the five member states that do not recognize Kosovo, Spain is the most 
outspoken and has the toughest stance that some may argue is even more hard-lined than that of 
Russia and Serbia. Spain refuses any official meetings with Kosovar authorities and continuously 
reject Kosovo visas and passports. On top of that, Spain repeatedly votes against Kosovo’s 
accession into other international organizations such as UNESCO and FIFA (Demjaha 2019). 
The only conceivable way that Spain can reverse its position is if Serbia formally recognizes 
Kosovo and redraws its borders. If an official normalization agreement were signed, or a  special 
clause were written into Serbia’s accession agreement, Spain would have no choice in the matter 
but to recognize Kosovo. Until this is achieved, the EU must adapt to this position and find new 
means to achieve consensus on Serbian accession, while still ensuring Kosovo’s accession and 
recognition remain on the table.  
Cyprus’ Position. From the onset Cyprus has positioned itself against Kosovo’s 
statehood, citing international law and respect of human rights as its premier reasoning. Due to 
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the consequences of the Turkish invasion and occupation, Cyprus is steadfast in its refusal to 
recognize Kosovo and instead stipulates that its sovereignty must be determined by negotiations 
between Kosovo and Serbia (Ioannides 2017). For reasons mentioned above, Kosovar visas and 
travel documents are not recognized in Cyprus, and it voted against Pristina’s application for 
UNESCO membership. It position is supported by its declaration that Kosovo’s independence is 
not in line with international law and that the right of self-determination does not give a nation 
legal competence to secede. Like Spain, Cyprus’ motivations and its position are hard-lined and 
based on core values and concerns. Serbia maintains close ties with Cyprus and is the only 
Western Balkan state with successful trade and tourism relations. Due to its value-based foreign 
policy and close ties with Serbia, Cyprus does not pursue an engagement policy with Kosovo. 
This is not likely to change unless the UN Security Council approves a settlement between 
Serbia and Kosovo. Cyprus will not take a harder stance than Serbia and will follow suit if it 
formally recognizes Kosovo and comes to a normalization agreement.  
 
Non-Recognizers and Engagers  
 Greece’s Position. Unlike Spain, Greece is not as vocal nor assertive on its non-
recognition position, and actually pursues a strong policy of engagement with Pristina. Out of the 
five member states that do not recognize Kosovo, Greece has the most substantial political and 
economic interests in the Western Balkans. Greece defended its non-recognition position, 
explaining that it is based on respect for international law, the territorial integrity of states, and 
regional stability in the Western Balkans (Armakolas 2017). Its position is somewhat motivated 
by concerns that Kosovo will set a precedent for Cyprus, albeit not as strong as Spain’s disdain 
of Catalonia’s secession. While other non-recognizers do not have liaison offices in Pristina, 
Greece maintains an embassy in Kosovo’s capital (Armakolas 2017). There have been numerous 
formal as well as informal meetings between the two since 2008, and more importantly Greece 
recognizes Kosovar travel document which both Spain and Cyprus fail to do. Greek officials 
have not ruled out a decision to recognize Kosovo by stating that Greece will support any 
Kosovo status that results from legal, mutual, and negotiated agreements and normalization 
between Kosovo and Serbia. Greece’s aspirations are in line with EU enlargement policy and it 
formally aims to promote the integration of the Western Balkans into the EU. Greece is 
committed to promoting bilateral trade and investment with Kosovo, and trade relations, as well 
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as economic connections, are strengthening between the two. This implies that at some point 
Greece will truly consider recognizing Kosovo as a sovereign state, or that Greece expects there 
to be a special clause written into Serbia’s accession negotiation.  
 Romania’s Position. Romania’s position within the EU is not as influential as the likes 
of Spain and Greece, yet the member states prove that relations with Kosovo and the position’s 
on engagement can evolve over time. Its reasons for non-recognition are embedded in 
international law and the fact that Kosovo may set a risky precedent for other separatist 
movements, such as pro-Russian separatists in Romania (Ivan 2017). In 2011 the Romanian 
president declined to participate in a meeting of heads of state in Warsaw with former US 
President Obama because Kosovo would be present at the meetings. Since then, Romania has 
loosened its non-recognition position and organized several multilateral meetings with Kosovo. 
Romania is now a key contributor to Kosovo’s development and integration with other EU 
member states. Its close ties with Serbia suggest that Romania’s position will only be officially 
altered when Kosovo is formally recognized by Serbia and will adapt its position accordingly.  
 Slovakia’s Position. Despite its refusal to recognize Kosovo, Slovakia makes it 
abundantly clear that is willing to engage with the disputed state. Much like Romania and 
Greece, Slovakia insisted that Kosovo’s independence was to be a matter decided mutually with 
Serbia. However, from 2008 forward Slovakia has maintained a liaison office within Kosovo, 
holds consistent meetings with officials in Kosovo, and recognizes Kosovar travel documents 
and visas. Slovakia is so deeply engaged in Kosovo relations that it appeared as if it were ready 
to change its position and formally recognize Kosovo (Nič 2017), with speculations this move 
would be in conjuncture with Greece and Romania. Although no move was actually carried out, 
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Recognizers and Engagers 
 Germany’s Position. Germany, along with France, is one of the most influential EU 
member states. Its own foreign policy is linked with that of the EU, meaning its policies are 
deeply embedded in integration, cooperation, and European values. Germany’s regional role in 
the Western Balkans continues to grow, especially considering as of January 2020, Kosovo lost 
its other biggest supporter in the EU due to Brexit. Its dedication to the integration of Europe and 
enlargement of the EU encourages Germany to actively pursue Kosovo’s statehood and 
independence. Germany even goes one step further than the other 21 member states that 
recognize Kosovo by actively pressuring Serbia to normalize its relations, gaining more bilateral 
recognition, and advocating for Kosovo’s membership in additional international organizations. 
Germany has been instrumental in garnering high recognition numbers amongst EU member 
states, acting as the most outspoken advocate of Kosovo’s sovereign statehood (Himmrich 2017). 
Germany makes it clear that Serbia must commit to normalized relations with Serbia in order to 
move ahead in the accession process. Furthermore, Germany will not support Serbia’s 
membership ambitions if the Kosovo question is not addressed properly prior to accession. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that Germany will support a special conditionality clause written 
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into Serbia’s accession negotiations. Its visions of integration and its commitment to EU 
enlargement are not be mistaken for desperation. Germany will not cut corners in order to satisfy 
its foreign policy and EU goals. Germany will not consider Serbia’s accession if Kosovo is not 
addressed, and its ambitions for regional stability in the Western Balkans include Kosovo’s own 
accession into the EU.  
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Post-war Identity  
 Croatia was the first in a series of similar states in the EU’s enlargement plan for the 
Western Balkans. The region was plagued with internal and external ethnic conflicts and border 
disputes during the 1990s. Its accession to the EU was the most complex process of integration 
up until now when more Western Balkan states are moving closer to accession. The proceeding 
section will highlight the reasons why Croatia is the first successful case of Western Balkan 
enlargement and how that differs from Serbia’s accession by examining multiple factors of the 
process and of the individual cases. It is important to note that Croatia distinguishes itself from 
its neighbors by arguing that regional candidates are far behind in terms of post-war 
reconstruction and democratization (Jovic 2011). Croatia asserts that its Western Balkan 
neighbors still have unresolved internal issues and open disputes with neighbors, as is the case 
with Serbia and Kosovo. The newest member state made a point to differentiate itself from 
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Western Balkan neighbors and argued that this grouping would only hinder its own chances of 
accession. In almost all cases of war, there is a perceived winner and a clear loser, as well as the 
typical “good guy” versus the “bad guy.” Following the conflict in the 1990s, Croatia was 
viewed not only as the winner but also as the victim of war and foreign aggression. The ethnic 
Serbs living in Croatia were labeled as foreign invaders despite the fact that they did not come 
from anywhere else and had roots in Croatia. This image was reflected not only within Croatia 
but also projected itself among the EU. With that being said, Croatia was not exempt from post-
war obligations that would ensure its accession, but nonetheless it was granted EU membership 
well before any of its Western Balkan neighbors may achieve the same feat.  
 Serbia has faced countless setbacks in terms of democratization and Europeanization 
since the 1990s. Its continued dispute with Kosovo paints the image of an unstable political 
environment, which makes them both a less than ideal candidate. Furthermore, while the EU 
continues to approach Western Balkan enlargement in the same manner, Serbia’s western values 
and support for EU membership are waning. Given that the majority of EU member states 
recognize Kosovo as legitimate, Serbia is seen as denying a country its sovereignty and 
independence. This does not sit well with Kosovo-recognizers. Who view this as oppressive and 
harmful to the region’s stability. Therefore, Kosovo is seen as the loser and the victim in this 
situation, meaning Serbia’s accession cannot be approached the same way as Croatia’s simply in 
terms of post-war identities.  
 
Stabilization and Association Process  
 The Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) is the EU’s soft power policy towards 
the Western Balkans. It was developed with intentions of offering bigger incentives but also had 
more demanding conditions and an emphasis on regional cooperation (Fisher 2005). The SAP is 
guided by the principle of conditionality based on the candidate country’s compliance with the 
Copenhagen Criteria, allowing the EU to control the pace of the enlargement process in the 
Western Balkans. In 2001, Croatia signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) 
and formally started accession negotiations by creating a contractual relationship with the EU 
(Horopakha 2018). This agreement stipulated the gradual implementation of a free trade area and 
a dedication to reforms towards EU values and standards that would eventually steer Croatia to 
EU membership. The SAP was the basis of political dialogue for regional cooperation due to the 
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fact that it encouraged Croatia to promote European integration to its regional neighbors. It also 
contributed to the deepening of trade and economic relations by providing mechanisms for 
management and monitoring all areas or relations (Horopakha 2018).  
 Regional cooperation is a key element to the EU’s Western Balkan enlargement plan. 
With that being said, the SAP is a bilateral and regional tool that encourages cooperation with 
both regional neighbors and the EU. Initial negotiations on an SAA with Serbia began in 2005 
but were postponed in 2006  because of Serbia’s failure to cooperate fully with the ICTY and 
other political obstacles (Minic 2007). However, an official SAA went into force in 2013 
following and official declaration of candidacy in 2012. Serbia’s failure to adhere to political 
policies and democratization proved to be a factor in its decelerating accession when 
negotiations were halted in 2006. This exposes a pattern of backsliding and inconsistency when 
compared to the process of Croatia. Despite their regional similarity, the two are incomparable 
when it comes to post-war stabilization and willingness to fully cooperate with the EU. Within 
Croatia there was a complete desire and consensus among politicians that EU membership was 
the ultimate goal, and there was not a single anti-EU party in the parliament (Sabic 2019). This 
also leads to the conclusion that Croatia prioritized EU accession more than Serbia does, which 
means incentivizing membership is not the most effective soft power tool in dealing with the 
Kosovo dispute. SAP and SAAs are the most unique and adaptable tool that the EU uses in its 
Western Balkan enlargement plan because it is specific to each candidate, meaning it is flexible 
and specialized by nature.  
 
Adhering to the Acquis Communataire   
 Western Balkan enlargement is unique from previous EU expansions, and the process 
was adjusted with Croatia’s accession. When negotiations were started, key problems of the 
region were identified and the acquis communataire was refined accordingly. From Croatia’s 
accession onward, the acquis will now include justice and fundamental rights taking into account 
the protection of ethnic minorities and war crime issues of the 1990s (Sabic 2019). Croatia had 
been exposed to the most advanced set of acquis criteria up until that point by raising the number 
of chapters from 31 to 35, underscoring the EU’s ability to change the accession process where it 
sees fit. Furthermore, the SAP took over as the most important carrot tool for the EU because it 
imposed specific guidelines for each country. Thus, the EU is willing to adapt its process for 
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each state in the Western Balkans, but Serbia’s accession is even more unique and will require 




Consensus and its Effect on Western Balkan Enlargement 
 Despite the fact that all member states support Serbia’s accession into the EU, the process 
is slowing substantially due to a lack of consensus over Kosovo’s recognition. This is the first 
time in the history of EU enlargement policy that a candidate’s accession is blocked by a non-EU 
actor. Not all member states share the same interests when it comes to enlargement, which is 
apparent in the dispute over Kosovo’s legitimacy. The five member states that do not recognize 
Kosovo’s statehood manage to slow down Serbia’s accession process unintentionally as a result 
of the opposition. Member states that do recognize Kosovo are not as vocal as the non-
recognizers, aside from Germany. Yet even Germany’s influence is not powerful or effective 
enough to persuade non-recognizers to change their position, which is deeply embedded in fears 
of secessionist disputes within their own states. Although Greece, Romania, and Slovakia are 
willing to engage with Kosovo, their own relations with Serbia imply that positions will only 
change if Serbia itself recognizes Kosovo as a sovereign state. Lack of consensus over the 
Kosovo dispute is detrimental to Serbia’s EU aspirations. Furthermore, it destroys the EU’s 
Western Balkan enlargement plan until the dispute is settled in some manner. As the EU 
struggles to find a principled pragmatism approach to Serbia’s accession, Russia is redefining its 
relationship and its expanding influence in the Western Balkans. Its definitive stance on Kosovo 
it is a political move that unites Serbia with its historical Slavic ally, and creates a more positive 
view of Russia over the EU. As accession negotiations decelerate, Russian influence increases 
and threatens to diminish the relevance of EU membership, which will effectively disincentivize 
accession. This point of contention is not the main focus of this study, but nonetheless it is an 
important revelation that EU decision-makers must be aware of. Serbia’s accession is a time-
sensitive issue and must be completed sooner rather than later. Given that non-recognizers’ 
positions are unlikely to change in the near future the EU must pursue new avenues to address 
the Kosovo dispute and complete Serbia’s accession.  
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Adapting to Serbia’s Unique Position  
 Based on the evidence presented in this study it can be concluded that conditionality and 
SAAs are the most effective soft power tools in enlargement. The SAA with Croatia was 
successful in incentivizing EU membership while effectively Europeanizing the Western Balkan 
state. Thus, Croatia is a prime example of what an SAA is capable of when catered to the 
specific state rather than the Copenhagen Criteria which is generic and used for every candidate. 
Therefore, this study puts forth the recommendation that a special conditionality clause regarding 
Kosovo must be written into the Serbia SAA or final accession document. Noting that five EU 
member states are likely to remain non-recognizers unless Serbia miraculously changes, it is 
illogical to imply that Serbia must recognize Kosovo if it wants to become a member state. 
Furthermore, Russia relations are diminishing the influence that the EU has in Serbia, making the 
EU’s carrot less effective than initially thought. In order to complete Serbia’s accession process, 
the EU must stipulate that Serbia cannot veto Kosovo’s membership if the day arises, despite its 
position on Kosovo’s statehood. This would secure Serbia’s membership while simultaneously 
leaving the door open for the EU’s full Western Balkans enlargement plan. This alternative will 
also quell the current consensus dispute over Serbia’s accession between the recognizers and 
non-recognizers. It is advantageous for the EU to pursue this alternative in order to accelerate 
Serbia’s accession due to Russia’s rising influence, as well as set up a mechanism to settle the 
Kosovo dispute in other ways than the failed normalization negotiations. It is imperative that the 
EU is successful in its enlargement, democratization, and Europeanization of the Western 
Balkans to maintain its partnership and promote stability within the region. Ultimately this study 
does not adequately address the future of Kosovo’s accession, and therefore there is room for 
further research on this matter that would help to better explain the complications of enlargement 
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